By Tony Capaccio (Bloomberg) — The shipyard producing the US Navy’s new frigate has been hobbled by a failure to “achieve engineering and skilled workforce levels” for the medium-sized vessel, according...
I'm truely flabbergasted.
If it wasn't bad enough that the worlds largest and most powerful Navy in the world couldn't source an adequate domestically designed Frigate and as a consequence selected an Italian-based design....
US Navy’s New Warship Is Plagued by Worker Turnover
First of Navy’s new frigates is running up to three years late
Inexperienced labor and supervisors hobble Navy, analyst says
I'm truely flabbergasted.
If it wasn't bad enough that the worlds largest and most powerful Navy in the world couldn't source an adequate domestically designed Frigate and as a consequence selected an Italian-based design....
Well, yeah. Shipyards have been hiring workers based on contracts for ships they have to build for years and years now, not hiring them as employees and then finding work for the yard. Boeing did the same thing back in the 1990s, even, long before they merged with MDD.
Which is why the Navy needs to get into a long term consistent buying practice with their new construction.
I'm truely flabbergasted.
If it wasn't bad enough that the worlds largest and most powerful Navy in the world couldn't source an adequate domestically designed Frigate and as a consequence selected an Italian-based design....
US Navy’s New Warship Is Plagued by Worker Turnover
First of Navy’s new frigates is running up to three years late
Inexperienced labor and supervisors hobble Navy, analyst says
It doesn't.
In terms of the "Italian project" [design], I was attempting to emphasise just how enept the US Navy has become when it can't indigenously source an American designed Frigate....or should that be the US naval ship building industry, which can't design a Frigate to US needs and wants.....
It doesn't.
In terms of the "Italian project" [design], I was attempting to emphasise just how enept the US Navy has become when it can't indigenously source an American designed Frigate....or should that be the US naval ship building industry, which can't design a Frigate to US needs and wants.....
During the Cold War, the US Navy expected that, if the war ever turned hot, it would have to escort cargo ships across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in order to sustain America’s resource-intensive fight against the Soviet Union.
Only problem being that the Soviets weren't going to come out and play and instead sit back and defend their coastal waters. Those Cold War frigates were a waste of resources.
That meant frigates, scores of them. These well-armed but inexpensive vessels were supposed to perform the tedious, unglamorous and often dangerous job of shepherding big, slow, vulnerable ships through waters teeming with Soviet submarines.
These frigates were hardly inexpensive, even the Dealey class were considered too expensive, hence the development of the Claud Jones class, and the succeeding Bronstein, Garcia, Brooke and Knox were if anything even more expensive and capable, to the point that they were expected to perform general-purpose destroyer roles.
US Cold War DE/DEGs are if anything an excellent illustration of how modern combat systems greatly increase ship cost, and how attempts to cut costs, like the use of single shafts, will only create minor savings.
It doesn't.
In terms of the "Italian project" [design], I was attempting to emphasise just how enept the US Navy has become when it can't indigenously source an American designed Frigate....or should that be the US naval ship building industry, which can't design a Frigate to US needs and wants.....
Well do I have news for you - they started with an italian design, but after the Navy put its requirements on constellation - it is now projected to only have 15% commonality with the base design.
US Cold War DE/DEGs are if anything an excellent illustration of how modern combat systems greatly increase ship cost, and how attempts to cut costs, like the use of single shafts, will only create minor savings.
A bastardized form Norm Augustine's classic line on software holds: this analysis shows that in the future, the US defense budget will be only be able to afford one aircraft, it will be made of 100% electronics, and it will cost more per pound than its weight in gold. This seems impossible, but america's finest engineers were up to the task, inventing "software" a weightless substance of seemingly unlimited cost.
Only problem being that the Soviets weren't going to come out and play and instead sit back and defend their coastal waters. Those Cold War frigates were a waste of resources.
1) We didn't know that at the time, and
2) I'd argue that was a very poor decision on the part of the Soviets. They'd seen just how much materiel the US could produce if you gave us time to tool up. That shapes the entire war into basically having to rush to the English Channel before the US can send divisions over by plane to meet up with prepositioned equipment stocks.
1) We didn't know that at the time, and
2) I'd argue that was a very poor decision on the part of the Soviets. They'd seen just how much materiel the US could produce if you gave us time to tool up. That shapes the entire war into basically having to rush to the English Channel before the US can send divisions over by plane to meet up with prepositioned equipment stocks.
We actually did know it at the time. Every single Intel agency had the data by 1970 and told the Nato Navies.
Who preceed to not believe them for tge next 15 to 20 years despite repeat burgeoning from the Agencies. Cause they just couldn't believe it with the numbers of subs.
Except they forgot to factor in the Soviet views.
Which was the Soviets both figuring they COULDN'T defend against Nato convoys and ironicly planning on defensive fighting with spoiling attacks only.
Which was basically the Nato doctrine in a shellnut. Both sides thought that tge OTHER was going to attack first, not them.
So they Prioritize protection of what they saw as real war winners.
The Boomers.
The Soviets saw those as a way to point a shotgun directly in the US Face. With them doubling down when SOSUS became reliable enough blunt any convoy attack with just aircraft let alone SSN doing their thing
Which is why in the late 80s we saw a swing from convoy protection to Bastion breaking of the Soviet Boomer hides.
"Navy Awards $1B Contract for 5th, 6th Constellation-class Frigates"
The award is for FFG-66 and FFG-67, the fifth and sixth frigates in the program, Fincantieri is slated to finish the work in April 2030?
The contract award also comes as the frigate program faces three year delay due to ongoing workforce challenges at the yard in Marinette, Wisconsin and a still incomplete design.
While the design at one point shared 85 percent commonality with the FREMM, it’s not closer to 15 percent, USNI News understands.
Appears Congress has lost all trust in the Navy Admirals and "House poised to require ‘100 percent’ ship design from Navy prior to construction"
House lawmakers are moving to force the US Navy to complete its ships’ designs “100 percent” prior to lead vessel construction due to years-long “continued frustration” with the service advancing programs before they were ready for “prime time,” according to a senior member.
The more specific policy language would close apparent loopholes the Pentagon had been using and force a major change compared to how previous programs had been run.
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Carlos Del Toro announced in Paris that a future Constellation-class guided-missile frigate will be named USS Lafayette (FFG 65), June 29.
Graphic rendering of the future USS Lafayette (FFG 65), named in honor of Marquis de Lafayette and his service during the American Revolutionary War. USS Lafayette is the fourth of the new Constellation-class frigates, scheduled to commission in 2029. The Constellation-class guided-missile...
The Navy is naming its fourth Constellation-class frigate in honor of Marquis de Lafayette, a Frenchman who helped the United States win the Revolutionary War against the British. The fourth frigate will bear the name USS Lafayette (FFG-65), Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro announced...
Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro announced that a future Constellation-class Guided Missile Frigate (FFG 66) will be named USS Hamilton. Secretary Del Toro made the announcement, May 23, while
www.navy.mil
However, this has the potential to be a tiny bit confusing because there is already a USCGC Hamilton, one of the National Security Cutters, named after the same person.
Navy Frigate: Unstable Design Has Stalled Construction and Compromised Delivery Schedules
GAO-24-106546
Published: May 29, 2024.
When the Navy planned to acquire guided missile frigates—a class of small warship—it took steps aimed at delivering these ships faster. For example, to reduce the risk of design and technology problems, it chose to use many technologies that had already been proven on other ships.
However, the Navy undercut this approach by starting construction on the first frigate before finishing its design, among other missteps. Due to ongoing major design challenges, construction on the first ship is at a standstill. Now, the Navy forecasts the ship will be delivered 3 years late.
What GAO Found
Over at least 2 decades, the Navy's Constellation class Guided Missile Frigate program plans to acquire and deliver up to 20 frigates—multi-mission, small surface combatant warships—at a combined cost of over $22 billion. To reduce technical risk, the Navy and its shipbuilder modified an existing design to incorporate Navy specifications and weapon systems. However, the Navy's decision to begin construction before the design was complete is inconsistent with leading ship design practices and jeopardized this approach. Further, design instability has caused weight growth. The figure shows the frigate's 3D design—a component of design stability—as incomplete over 1 year after construction began.
Delays in completing the ship design have created mounting construction delays. The Navy acknowledges that the April 2026 delivery date, set in the contract at award, is unachievable. The lead frigate is forecasted to be delivered 36 months later than initially planned. The program office tracks and reports design progress, but its design stability metric hinges largely on the quantity—rather than quality—of completed design documents. This limits insight into whether the program's schedule is achievable. If the Navy begins construction on the second frigate without improving this metric, it risks repeating the same errors that resulted in construction disruptions and delays with the lead frigate.
The frigate is using many mission systems already proven on Navy ships. However, the Navy has yet to demonstrate two systems—the propulsion and machinery control systems. A planned update to the frigate test plan—combined with the opportunity afforded by schedule delays—could offer the Navy the chance to conduct land-based testing of these two unproven systems. This testing would reduce the risk of discovering issues after the ship is at sea.
The frigate is using a traditional, linear development approach for design and construction. The Navy has historically experienced schedule delays, cost growth, or both in prior shipbuilding programs using this approach. The Navy has incorporated elements of leading practices into its acquisition strategy. However, further incorporating these practices in an updated acquisition strategy could position the program, when contracting for future frigates, to better respond to evolving mission needs.
Recommendations
GAO is making five recommendations, including that the Navy restructure its design stability metric to measure progress based more on the quality than quantity of design documents; use the improved metric to assess the design stability before beginning construction of the second frigate; incorporate additional land-based testing into the frigate test plan; and identify opportunities to further incorporate leading practices for product development into the frigate acquisition strategy. The Navy agreed with four recommendations and partially agreed with the recommendation related to updating the test plan. GAO maintains that all five recommendations should be fully implemented.
From ddg-1000 to LCS to this. Bring out those AUKUS papers and lets call the Koreans and Japanese. Let them build our ships. I don't mind mandatory korean/japanese language classes for rear admirals or above, mandatory participation in their military parades and having to fly their flags on our ships. Let just do it.
From ddg-1000 to LCS to this. Bring out those AUKUS papers and lets call the Koreans and Japanese. Let them build our ships. I don't mind mandatory korean/japanese language classes for rear admirals or above, mandatory participation in their military parades and having to fly their flags on our ships. Let just do it.
Rather like repair work on the house. By the time "You should always know there are hidden costs in ANY home repair" is given by the lowest quote, you have the most expensive job.
Security light on the corner of the building I live in went out. It took SIX call outs to fix the broken one rather than LOOK at the working light and suck their teeth etc. Housing management just paid out because the company sent in "The cheapest quote for A callout". So I point out that six callouts from the cheapest quote is more expensive than one callout from the top quote with a fix on day one.
Receptionist ask's "What do you think I am a moron"?
"No duck, you would need several years of education to raise yourself to that high level, why not ask the person reporting the fault if it has been fixed before paying out"?
It's not often that I advocate for Congress messing in the Armed Forces affairs, but right now they need to put the boot in and some people need to be fired.
It's not often that I advocate for Congress messing in the Armed Forces affairs, but right now they need to put the boot in and some people need to be fired.
A lot of that is because we went from designing and building a new class of cruiser, destroyer, or frigate every few years, to not designing any in 20. The Burkes were designed in the early 80s. The next class of surface combatants (I'm not counting the LCS since that's a whole other issue) weren't designed until the early 2000s (Zumwalt class). And then, to compound the issue, instead of moving on to a new, more conventional design after the Zumwalts, the Navy restarted Burke production, let all those newly experienced designers walk away, and waited 20 years to design the next surface combatant.
Same for carriers. The Navy went from designing a new class every few years starting with Ranger all the way back in the 1920s through to the Nimitz class in the 1960s. On average, the Navy was designing a new class of carrier every 5 years. Then the Navy didn't design a new carrier for 40 years.
It's not just ships either. The Military as a whole has gotten extremely complacent in designing new hardware. The Air Force got the F-16 in the mid 70s. The next new fighter wasn't designed for more than a decade (F-22). The Army went from designing a new tank every few years (starting with the Stuart and Lee), then they got the Abrams and they haven't designed a new tank in more than 40 years.
Cost has a lot to do with it. As hardware becomes more sophisticated and expensive, Congress (and the branches) want to ensure that they're maximizing their dollars by extending production runs as long as possible. Why spend billions on a new design that offers a 5% improvement over your current design when your current piece of equipment is still good enough? In a vacuum, that makes sense. Rock with what you've got until tech makes a leap and you can get a 50% improvement to justify the money. Except by the time tech makes that leap, you're horribly out of practice at designing your new equipment, and you run into issue after issue rebuilding your institutional knowledge.
Don't think Navy has ever recovered from abolishing BuShips 1966 when the Navy lost its in house institutional knowledge on design and build of warships.
The more specific policy language would close apparent loopholes the Pentagon had been using and force a major change compared to how previous programs had been run.
The more specific policy language would close apparent loopholes the Pentagon had been using and force a major change compared to how previous programs had been run.
The Constellation program is totally immune to cancellation. Why? Wisconsin is a swing state in terms of voting. Neither party is going threaten a program in a swing state. Congress might be able to enforce a 100% completed design requirement for future programs but this one is just going to have to play out.
In hindsight, the first of the class should have been built in Italy, perhaps with American workers and engineers apprenticing with their more experienced and capable Italian colleagues. Changes should have been limited to American systems with absolutely no dimensional changes! If the US Navy had qualms about stability margins, they could have substituted the far cheaper rotating version of SPY(6).
The Constellation program is totally immune to cancellation. Why? Wisconsin is a swing state in terms of voting. Neither party is going threaten a program in a swing state. Congress might be able to enforce a 100% completed design requirement for future programs but this one is just going to have to play out.
In hindsight, the first of the class should have been built in Italy, perhaps with American workers and engineers apprenticing with their more experienced and capable Italian colleagues. Changes should have been limited to American systems with absolutely no dimensional changes! If the US Navy had qualms about stability margins, they could have substituted the far cheaper rotating version of SPY(6).
However, Congress is not innocent in the current situation. They pushed for the Navy to start building FFG-62 ASAP, which basically forced the degree of concurrency that is now screwing stuff up. Maybe another year of design work before keel laying would have mitigated the issues we are seeing now.
However, Congress is not innocent in the current situation. They pushed for the Navy to start building FFG-62 ASAP, which basically forced the degree of concurrency that is now screwing stuff up. Maybe another year of design work before keel laying would have mitigated the issues we are seeing now.
In a more general sense, Congress also continues to focus on the wrong things. Industry and Service vets before FFG(X) launched pointed out that the basic design of a ship is not a weak point in current capabilities, its program management and concurrent design-build practices which continue to be a mess. But the legislators believed LCS and DDG-1000 failures pointed to a basic inability to make something ship-shaped go into the water. So they fixed the problem that didn't need fixing, and ignored the problems that very much do.
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