Soviet/Russian IFF

From Janes Avionics 1999

CP3-1P (facility 6231P)
The airborne radar interrogator CP3-1P (facility 6231P) of the 60P IFF system is designed for identification of friendly air, land and sea platforms. The 6231P facility operates on a co-operative question and answer principle and provides the following capabilities:

general identification `friend or foe' of air, overwater and ground vehicles equipped with transponders and detected by radar
selective identification of air, overwater and ground vehicles on the principle `where are you?'
position location of ground vehicles.
The 6231P facility comprises 8 LRUs: unit 551 - receiver-transmitter; unit 542 - reply evaluation unit; unit 541 - video processor; unit 591 - power supply unit; unit 581-1 - controls; unit 2410 - SLS modulator; unit 526 - RF switch; unit 531-5 - auxiliary controls unit.


Specifications
Maximum range of positive identification: not less than detection range of associated radars
Angular resolution: determined by the radiation pattern of the CP3-1P interrogator antenna (autonomous or built into the radar antenna)
Transmitter power output: 1.5 to 3.5 kW peak
Receiving/decoding sensitivity: –76 dBm
Total weight: not less than 26.3 kg
Total volume: not greater than 23.3 dm3
Power consumption: 115 V AC (±5%), 380-1,050 Hz, <2.1A; +27 V DC ±10%, <0.7A; +10 V DC, <0.7A; –10 V DC, <0.2A


Operational status
Designed for both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
 

Attachments

  • SRZ-1P.jpg
    SRZ-1P.jpg
    84 KB · Views: 57
  • 6201R.jpg
    6201R.jpg
    120.2 KB · Views: 53
  • 6231R.jpg
    6231R.jpg
    100.2 KB · Views: 43
There are many references around to Russian IFF systems (e.g. Parol, Kremnij, SRO, etc.). There are also some references to techniques of operation (e.g. multi frequency, frequency-modulated pulses, etc). But there appears to be no complete explanation of how the Russian IFF system works - unlike Western IFF, which is fully explained in STANAG 4193. Does anyone have any further knowledge on this subject? Even snippets of information here and there would be interesting in trying to put an overall IFF system description together!
 
My interest is mainly from the point of view of replacing Russian IFF with compatible Western IFF. In this respect, the following are important for the interrogator:
* the electrical interface across the sliprings/rotary joints
* the control signals from the operator and/or primary radar
* the outputs from the interrogator to the display system and/or primary radar

Replacement of Russian transponders with Western Transponders is much more straightforward.

This kind of information should not be overly sensitive?
 
suidooster said:
My interest is mainly from the point of view of replacing Russian IFF with compatible Western IFF. In this respect, the following are important for the interrogator:
* the electrical interface across the sliprings/rotary joints
* the control signals from the operator and/or primary radar
* the outputs from the interrogator to the display system and/or primary radar

Replacement of Russian transponders with Western Transponders is much more straightforward.

This kind of information should not be overly sensitive?
Click to expand...
any further info regarding installation of western IFF would be strongly dependent on both the western IFF and russian radar type. What russian radar and western IFF are you talking about???
 
This would be the whole range of Russian radars, from ground-based early warning through to tracking and fire control radars, naval and airborne radars. The Western IFF would be standard as per STANAG 4193.
 
I do have information about installing STANAG 4193 IFF interrogator to russian airborne radar, but I doubt it will be any use to you as you do not know the russian system in detail.
 
All information is useful. We are planning to talk with the Russian OEMs, but any foreknowledge would be of assistance I'm sure!
 
Hi,,
I noticed a new aerials -Hokey type- in the new flanker Su-35BM . The aerials are located just under forward section of the fighter beneath the cockpit , and the other one just under tail "spike"


Those two locations used to regular locations for russian IFF antenna "Parol". Are those antennas represent a new IFF system in russian air force and air defense ?
 

Attachments

  • 10nasalcloseupom9.jpg
    10nasalcloseupom9.jpg
    28 KB · Views: 148
  • 03beginningoftransportabg6.jpg
    03beginningoftransportabg6.jpg
    29.6 KB · Views: 147
For your general edification, here is a very interesting technical manual on the SRO-2/SRZO-2 IFF system in Russian. Its in djvu format, so you might need Windjview or similar to open it.

www.mediafire.com

MediaFire

MediaFire is a simple to use free service that lets you put all your photos, documents, music, and video in a single place so you can access them anywhere and share them everywhere.
www.mediafire.com www.mediafire.com
 
Holly Cow...

Then we will see a Parol manual and the whole hell will breaks!

By the way, in AiK 12/2002 issue, they mention that different SA-2 and SA-3 SAM variants received Parol IFF equipments since late 70s.

I will try to dig the exact variants related to SAM systems...if anybody is interested :D
 
overscan said:
For your general edification, here is a very interesting technical manual on the SRO-2/SRZO-2 IFF system in Russian. Its in djvu format, so you might need Windjview or similar to open it.

http://www.mediafire.com/?sharekey=5524216a713f2aad2fb2ca15d7ea42d9cafd8b52ef25b0865621d66e282a0ee8
Click to expand...

Good morning, Do you still have the manual originally available at the above link? The link is now broken...

Thanks
 
A detailed description in English of SRO-2 Khrom taken from examination of a MiG-17 which landed in the Hoefstadt area on 26 April 1967.
 

Attachments

  • CIA-RDP78-03066R000400190001-6.pdf
    1.7 MB · Views: 57
suidooster said:
There are many references around to Russian IFF systems (e.g. Parol, Kremnij, SRO, etc.). There are also some references to techniques of operation (e.g. multi frequency, frequency-modulated pulses, etc). But there appears to be no complete explanation of how the Russian IFF system works - unlike Western IFF, which is fully explained in STANAG 4193. Does anyone have any further knowledge on this subject? Even snippets of information here and there would be interesting in trying to put an overall IFF system description together!
Click to expand...
it is possible to get STANAG 4193 Document . i want this document .
 
Thirty-five years ago in the USSR, a decision was made to massively re-equip all military equipment, air defense forces and radar stations with the combined arms state radar identification system "friend or foe" "Password". The RG correspondent met with the general designer of the system, the hero of socialist labor, Ildus Mostyukov. The scientist, whose activities were classified for many years, explained the difficulties of developing the system, why, before the advent of “Password,” the Soviet air defense, navy and air force were “blind” every three years, and how the US intelligence services prevented them from working.

The “friend or foe” identification system originated during the Second World War. It first appeared among the US and British troops, where losses from friendly fire amounted to 20-25 percent. Following them, a similar system was developed in the USSR. But it was not uniform - each type of military had its own frequencies and codes. By 1955, the first combined arms system "Silicon-2" was created. But it also had a serious drawback - a small number of codes. Because of this, it was easily detected by radio intelligence and was very vulnerable if the equipment fell into the hands of a potential enemy. And this happened every three years. Either our plane will crash somewhere, or the traitors in the factories will pass on information to foreign intelligence. After which all codes were declassified. Thus, after the war, our country had the most powerful armed forces in the world, but the identification system was the weakest point in the defense of the USSR.

In 1961, when the equipment once again fell into the hands of a potential enemy, a meeting of the defense department of the party's Central Committee was held. It brought together the ministers of the radio industry, shipbuilding, aviation industry, heads of departments of the Ministry of Defense, and all the luminaries in the field of radar. There were about fifty people in the hall. The head of the defense department of the Central Committee, Ivan Serbin, took the stage. He pointed his finger at the audience and said very angrily: “How long will you bring the country to its knees? Develop a system that is not afraid of discredit!” And after that he left. The meeting ended. We were all in shock. What to do? Then Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Roman Pokrovsky announced a closed competition to solve the problem. Our Moscow parent institute NII-17, which developed Silicon-2, proposed making a million instead of thirty codes. But this did not solve the problem, since radio intelligence worked well and the computer technology of that time was able to decipher them. We at OKB-294 proposed another option. It was based on cryptographic coding methods. They cannot be declassified, even if the equipment ends up in the wrong hands. It will simply turn into a piece of metal. Nothing can be done with her. Our proposal was accepted. And in 1962, by a special resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, our OKB was transformed into the country's leading institute, engaged in the development of the “friend or foe” system. I was appointed general designer.


We had to start work almost from scratch. We could not rely on global experience in this area. He simply wasn't there. The Americans carried out their development of the identification system in parallel, slightly ahead of us. But it was impossible to get information from them. Throughout our work we tried to do this through the GRU and the KGB, but it was all in vain. This project was so secret among them. But our special services also looked after us in such a way that the spies could not find out anything. So we had such competitions with them. So development was difficult. And in 1966, as luck would have it, our equipment again ended up in the hands of foreign intelligence services. A Soviet plane, which was flying from Nizhny Novgorod to the area where Soviet troops were located, crashed on German territory. His engine failed while he was in the sky over Berlin. And in order not to fall on the city, the pilots sacrificed themselves and sent the plane into a lake in the “English zone”. The commander of our group of troops in Germany, General Peter Koshevoy, knowing the importance of the secrets contained in this plane, decided to introduce a tank battalion there and get the plane before the British took it. But at this time there was a party congress, and a command came from Moscow to avoid all sorts of international complications. The operation was cancelled.

As a result, the British military pulled the plane out of the lake, sent it to England, and the identification system was declassified.

A commission was created to investigate this incident, of which I was also a member. Following the results of its work, a meeting was held, attended by the chairman of the military-industrial complex, air defense and air force commanders. And they all gave a very negative assessment of our identification system and radio industry. It once again fell into the wrong hands, and our air defense and naval forces were “blind.” They no longer distinguished where they were and where they were strangers. At this meeting I received a reprimand for missing the deadlines for creating a new system.

At that time, I could only offer to make “patches” for the old system. What is it? It was necessary to urgently re-equip the entire army, change the equipment on all planes and ships. And many military facilities were temporarily put out of action, which caused enormous damage to the country.

And this was far from the only obstacle that arose during the development process. When we had practically prepared the technical design and were about to start producing prototypes, the Americans gave us a big blow. For successful implementation, the new system must operate at the same frequencies as the old one during the transition period. And in the international organization "Regulations of Communications" the Americans ruled. And so they gave our identification frequency to Western European television. We made mock-ups of the new equipment, went to East Germany and tested how television affected the system. We realized that television signals were completely blocking the channel. And we had to leave this frequency. And this immediately created a problem of placement on airplanes. The customer required that the equipment be located in the old installation locations. There are simply no others on the plane. And during the transition period, new equipment must include old equipment, which affects the dimensions. It didn't fit! And we solved this problem throughout the entire development with great difficulty. The deadlines were missed, every six months we were heard by a military commission. During my work, I received six reprimands from the ministry, not counting the first. But, in the end, the task was accomplished through microminiaturization.

Two systems for the whole world

In 1977 we completed state tests. The acceptance committee was headed by Marshal Evgeny Savitsky, a legendary pilot and twice hero of the Soviet Union. The system was awarded the Lenin Prize.

And in 1980, military tests took place. The military felt that government testing was not enough for such massive and very expensive equipment. To see it in action, the Ministry of Defense conducted large-scale military exercises. Hundreds of aircraft, radar systems, and ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the Odessa Military District took part in them. And after this, a decision was made on the massive rearmament of the army. It lasted for five years. Thirty factories of the Soviet Union participated in the project. It is very important that we completed the re-equipment before Yeltsin’s reforms.

If we had been a little late, the system would not have seen the light of day, because the factories had collapsed, and the country would not have been able to afford to spend that kind of money in the 90s.

This equipment will be in service for a very long time. It cannot be decrypted. Aircraft with the "Parol" system many times fell into the hands of a potential enemy, but this no longer mattered. There were no "filled" codes in the equipment. Thousands of their variants change every second according to a random law.

In the USA they created a similar system only a little earlier than us. In general, only two countries in the world could afford such developments: the USA and the USSR. Firstly, this is due to the fact that the United States leads NATO, and the Soviet Union was the leader of the Warsaw Pact countries. And, accordingly, all states included in the alliances accepted these systems. Secondly, the cost of the system is so enormous that not every country can afford it. The search for money for our project was personally carried out by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Alexei Kosygin. The development cost about five billion dollars.

Now the "Parol" system is used by forty countries, including all members of the CSTO. And those countries that moved away from us after the collapse of the USSR switched to the American system. In particular Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia. It cost them, of course, a lot of money.

China does not yet have its own national “friend or foe” warning system, but is actively working on it. India is buying both the Russian and American systems.
Click to expand...
rg.ru

Как создавалась секретная советская система опознавания "свой-чужой" - Российская газета

Тридцать пять лет назад в СССР было принято решение о массовом переоснащении всей военной техники, сил ПВО и радиолокационных станций общевойсковой государственной системой радиолокационного опознавания "свой-чужой" "Пароль". Корреспондент "РГ" встретился генеральным конструктором системы...
rg.ru rg.ru
 
Last edited:

MOSTYUKOV ILDUS SHAIKHULISLAMOVICH (B. 1928)​

Designer in the field of radio-electronic identification systems, director of the Kazan Research Electrophysical Institute of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry (now Federal Research and Production Center "Radioelectronics"). One of the creators of the “friend or foe” identification system.



Born in 1928 in Kazan. In 1947 he graduated from the Kazan Mechanics and Technology College. Since 1947, he worked at the Kazenergo enterprise: technician, energy systems dispatcher, senior engineer of the central dispatch service.

At the same time as working, he continued his education and graduated from the Kazan Aviation Institute in 1958. Since 1958, he worked in design bureau No. 294 of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry: engineer, senior engineer, leading engineer, head of laboratory, head of department, since 1960 - head of OKB-294. In 1962, on the basis of OKB-294, Scientific Research Institute No. 334 of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry was created (since 1967 - Kazan Electrophysical Institute, subsequently - Kazan Scientific Research Institute of Radio Electronics). Mostyukov was appointed its first director and at the same time, from 1962, the general designer of the Unified Combined Arms System of State Radar Identification of the country “Password” (“friend or foe”), having worked in these posts for 28 years.

By resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Research Institute No. 334 was appointed the lead institute for the development of this system. The result of many years of hard work was the creation of a unified state combined arms radar identification system, not inferior to modern similar systems of the USA and NATO. The system was created as a whole in 1970 and, after many years of complex testing, was put into service in 1977. It is still in service to this day. The main requirement of the customer was also fulfilled - even if one or more elements of the system fell into the hands of a potential enemy, the system could not be deciphered, much less reprogrammed.

Simultaneously with the design work, he supervised the creation of a research base: new production buildings, a testing ground, experimental laboratories, and social and cultural facilities.

Since 1989 - leading researcher at the department of the Kazan Electrophysical Institute. Since 1997 - Honorary Director - Advisor to the General Director of the FPPC "Radioelectronics". Deputy of the Supreme Council of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the 10th convocation (1980–1985). Deputy of the Kazan City Council of Workers' Deputies of several convocations. Candidate of Technical Sciences (1978). Professor. Author of 50 scientific papers and 24 inventions. Honorary Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan. Full member of the Academy of Military Historical Sciences, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. Honorary citizen of Kazan (2005). Honorary Professor of Kazan Technical University named after. A. N. Tupolev (now KNRTU-KAI).

For outstanding services in solving a particularly important state task, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (“closed”) dated July 2, 1980, Mostyukov Ildus Shaikhulislamovich was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor with the Order of Lenin and the Hammer and Sickle gold medal. Awarded the Order of Lenin (1980), the Red Banner of Labor (1971), and the medal “For Valiant Labor. In commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin" (1970). State Prize Laureate, Honored Worker of Science and Technology of the RSFSR (1986); honorary radio operator of the USSR (1963); honorary radio operator of the Russian Federation (2003); Honored Scientist of the Republic of Tatarstan (2013).
Click to expand...

kai.ru

КАЗАНСКИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ ТЕХНИЧЕСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ ИМ. А. Н. ТУПОЛЕВА - КАИ

kai.ru
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom